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Introduction
Population ecology and neoinstitutionalism lead organizational theories 
that incorporate organizational environments and view organizational 
dynamics at the macro-level. Organizations are either selected by their 
environments, according to population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977), or adapted to institutional legitimacy, according to neoinstitutionalism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Their emphasis on the interdependence 
between organizations and institutional environments identifies 
organizational form in population ecology or organizational field in 
neoinstitutionalism as the primary element in organizational evolution, but 
there has not been much research on how organizational forms or fields 
change (Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell, 2005). This lack of research concerning 
dynamism at the macro-level can be found in each theory.
First, population ecology is largely lacking in empirical research on 
population dynamics in spite of its theoretical interest in it. Carroll and 
Hannan (2000) theoretically articulated the concept of organizational “form,” 
but most empirical studies focus on the dynamics of individual organizations 
within a given industry, population, and form, which is likely in a stable, 
rather than in a dynamic environment. In a word, the dynamics of 
organizational form is understudied in the literature of population dynamics 
(Chiles, Meyer, and Hench, 2004; Singh, 2006: 179). Population ecology did 
not theorize the dynamic nature of environments as much as it did for 
organizational structures. According to population ecology, the environment 
of a particular form is the density of other forms, while those other forms 
need to be explained by their own environment. Political factors are hardly 
implemented in such environments (Ingram and Simons, 2000), and 
population ecology is not able to provide standard research guidelines for 
form-dynamics as much as it did for individual dynamics.1 Organizational 
environments are theorized in terms of risk and uncertainty, and 
sociopolitical factors that can affect risk and uncertainty are explored in this 
paper.
Second, neoinstitutionalism theoretically tells a convincing story of how 
strong a dominant institution is, as captured by the image of institutional 
1 Without doubt, population ecology is correct in arguing that legitimacy is a crucial determinant 
for the success of a new organizational form (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Ruef, 2000). However, the 
issue of legitimacy, which is essentially cognitive and symbolic, is much better theorized and 
studied in the literature of neoinstitutionalism.
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“iron cage” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) which is named after Weber’s 
bureaucratic “iron cage” (Weber, 1970), but it does not provide a comparable 
story of how the self-enforcing cycle of an institution can be eventually 
broken (Greif and Laitin, 2004). Driving forces for institutional changes of 
each case are examined (Haveman, 2000). Empirically, neoinstitutionalism 
has been accumulating diverse, interesting case studies but their general 
hypotheses have hardly been tested. Explanations tend to be ad-hoc, 
depending on the cases, and neoinstitutionalism explains nothing when 
trying to explain everything (Haveman, 2000: 478). This paper provides four 
evolutionary stages of an institutionalized organizational behavior and infers 
how the state and civil society can generally affect transitions between stages. 
This paper is also in line with Simons and Ingram’s (2003: 613) recommenda-
tion that “organizational theorists reengage with theories of the state.”
In summary, research on organizational dynamics at the form-level has 
been viewed as a fundamental, theoretical, but certainly under-developed, 
topic (Chiles, Meyer, and Hench, 2004; Singh, 2006: 179), and the goal of this 
paper is to contribute to this topic by proposing a typology on evolutionary 
stages of an organizational form. It will become clear that the typology is built 
on integrating population ecology and neoinstitutionalism. Subsequently, this 
proposed typology is intended to apply to both organizational forms, which 
emerge and are sustained through selection processes, and organizational 
practices, which emerge and become isomorphic to institutional environ-
ments through adaptive processes. In this regard, this paper is in line with the 
“weak selection” perspective (Singh, 2006: 188-189), where selection and 
adaptation are complementary rather than competing forces in evolution 
(Ruef, 2004). This typology is applicable to any systematic organizational 
behavior that is either imprinted as organizational forms or routinized as 
normative practices in organizations. In this sense, the terms “behavior,” 
“form,” and “practice” can be commonly referred to as the object of this 
typology, “behavior.” Another reason for using the term “behavior” for this 
typology is because this typology borrows insights from organizational 
behavior theories which have been paying great attention to risk and 
uncertainty entailed in organizational behavior. This will be discussed later in 
detail after clarifying two key organizational behaviors observed by 
population ecology and neoinstitutionalism, i.e., inertia and conformity, 
respectively.
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Confounding Concepts in Organizational Behavior and 
Decision-Making
Inertia and Conformity
In the field of contemporary organizational studies, two similar 
organizational behaviors have been studies under two different theories: 
inertia (vs. change) in population ecology (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1989; 
Miller and Chen, 1994) and conformity (vs. deviance) in neoinstitutionalism 
(e.g. , Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Phil l ips and Zuckerman, 2001). 
Organizational inertia is acquired through a selection process in an 
organizational population (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 67-77). It is 
analogous to biological inertia imprinted in an organic body, which hinders 
adaptation to environmental changes, resulting in the failure of adaptive 
survival and ultimately of evolving into a new population (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977).
In comparison, conformity is an adaptive behavior in pursuit of 
legitimacy, which is often ritually settled (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and 
achieves institutional isomorphism among different organizations (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). In other words, conformity assumes certain social norms 
in an organizational field that presume most organizations in the field to 
observe (see Scott, 2008). Observing norms brings legitimacy, which is a key 
resource for organizational success. When an organizational form is 
examined, whether the form is an outcome of selection and inertia or that of 
adaptation and conformity actually depends considerably on the researcher’s 
theoretical perspectives.
Figure 1 shows four possible combinations of organizational behavior 
derived from a cross-table of the two theoretical approaches under discussion 
here. As the cross-tabulation shows, both inertia and change can be either 
normative or deviant. However, inertia often associates with conformity and 
change with deviance both theoretically and empirically. Hannan and 
Freeman (1989), in their theoretical elaboration of why selection favors 
inertia, provide legitimacy pressure as an important cause for inertia 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 67-77), which clearly implies that inertia 
theoretically intersects with conformity. In addition, some empirical studies 
often combine organizational ecology and neoinstitutionalism to explain 
organizational behavior at the intersection (e.g., Dobrev, 2005; Haveman, 
1993; Lune and Martinez, 1999). Those intersecting behaviors will fall in the 
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shaded diagonal positions in Figure 1 (i.e., normative inertia or deviant 
change).
Then, how much attention have researchers been paying to the non-
intersecting or off-diagonal positions such as deviant inertia and normative 
change? In fact, normative change has been a central research topic among 
neoinstitutionalistic studies: any study about institutionalization or about 
later adopters driven by legitimacy pressure, by definition, examines 
normative change (e.g., Davis and Greve, 1997; Haveman, 1993; Hirsch, 1986; 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). In comparison to normative change, deviant 
inertia has not been studied much. In fact, deviant inertia is the other side of 
normative change because inertia is deviant when change is a norm. Further 
elaboration will be made later on deviant inertia most likely being observed 
in a disappearing population or in the process of deinstitutionalization.
In sum, most forms of organizational behavior in Figure 1 have been 
actively studied but not theoretically clarified with respect to their 
differences, similarities, and relations. Inertia and conformity are often 
viewed indiscriminately. Provided below is a theoretical typology of four 
forms of organizational behavior derived from a combination of 
organizational ecology and neoinstitutionalism. In order to develop this 
typology, two concepts, risk and uncertainty, that are mutually related to 
organizational decision-making as much as inertia and conformity.
Risk and Uncertainty
Discussion on risk and uncertainty is restricted to the outcome 
distribution of goal-oriented behavior. The relation between risk and 
uncertainty is well noticed by Knight (1921) and best summarized by March 
and his colleagues from an organizational perspective: High-risk behavior 
implies high variance in the distribution of its outcome (March, 1988; March 






Figure 1. Four Modes of Organizational Behavior.
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doubt, the level of risk entailed in one particular behavior is also affected by 
the mean of its outcome distribution as well as by its variance. However, if 
that behavior is risky because its expected outcome is close to failure, the 
behavior automatically has low probability of success, and there is no reason 
to take this type of risk in decision-making. Risks are worth taking only when 
the probability of success is reasonably high. Therefore, risks caused by the 
average expected outcome that is close to failures will be ignored in this 
study, and the focus will be limited to risks caused by the large variance of 
outcome distribution.
In comparison to high risk, high uncertainty implies unknown distribu-
tion of outcome (March and Simon, 1970: 93), i.e., the mean, variance, and 
other key parameters of an outcome distribution are not known. Therefore, 
the risk of a certain behavior under high uncertainty cannot be properly 
assessed because variance of distribution cannot be calculated if the 
distribution itself is not known. While risk-taking is a rational behavior given 
correct information on alternative outcomes, uncertainty or incorrect 
information enforces a “search” for “satisficing” rather than optimal behavior 
(March and Simon, 1970: 93-102).
In sum, certainty is a prerequisite to the choice between risk-taking and 
risk-averse behavior. Discussing behavioral risk under uncertainty does not 
make sense. But, if the scope of uncertainty is limited to an unknown mean 
of an outcome in combination with its known variance, different levels of 
risks are conceivable under uncertainty. Under this limited scope of 
uncertainty, a decision-maker knows that the outcome of a risk-averse 
behavior will be close to the mean outcome regardless of whether the mean 
outcome is close to success or failure. In sum, there are four possible 
combinations of behavior with different levels of risk under different levels of 
uncertainty as can be seen in Figure 2.
Like in Figure 1, the two diagonally shaded combinations in Figure 2 are 
likely to be viewed indiscriminately. For example, do entrepreneurs bet on 
uncertainty or take risks? They do not take risks but essentially bet on 





Figure 2. Four Conditions in Decision-Making.
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uncertainty, according to a classic specification by Knight (1921). 
Entrepreneurs explore unknown territories. In comparison, contemporary 
venture capitalists, who are often considered to be exploring uncertain 
territories, actually avoid uncertainty and take risks at best (Zider, 1998). It 
may be summarized that venture investments have evolved from taking 
uncertain entrepreneurial behavior to risk-taking financial strategies.
Then, what about off-diagonal forms, risk-aversion under highly 
uncertain mean outcome, and risk-taking under low uncertainty? In fact, 
risk-taking under low uncertainty should be expected in rational decision-
making but is actually hindered by human tendency for loss aversion, the 
implications of which have been actively studied (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; 
Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997). By contrast, we know little 
about risk-aversion under high uncertainty. As deviant inertia is less 
observed and understood than normative change, risk-aversion under high 
uncertainty is paid much less attention than risk-taking under low 
uncertainty. Is there any link between deviant inertia and risk-aversion under 
high uncertainty? The typology of organizational behavior hypothesized in 
this paper provides an answer to this question. Before viewing this typology, a 
mathematical expression of risk and uncertainty is briefly introduced.
A Mathematical Formalization of Risk and Uncertainty
Mathematical definitions of risk and uncertainty are specified here 
because this paper aims to provide not only a rigorous, but also a practical, 
typology which can guide empirical research. For this mathematical 
formalization, assume the outcome of an organizational behavior as a 
random variable X with its distribution function f. For convenience, it can be 
further assumed that larger values of X represent more successful outcomes. 
Then, E(X), or the expected value of X, measures how successful the behavior 
is on average. However, E(X) does not reveal anything about the variability of 
the outcome. Does the behavior yield consistent outcome around E(X) or 
show oscillating patterns between large successes and large failures? Var(X), 
or the variance of X, captures how much the outcome distribution spreads 
(Ross, 2002). In this way, the very concept of the variance is associated with 
the level of risk. In finance, variance or a rooted variance (i.e., standard 
deviation) is used to represent the risk associated with a given security or the 
risk of a portfolio of securities (Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe, 2005: 261-265). 
The basic idea is that the variance is a measure of risk or volatility associated 
with the outcome of a strategic choice. And this idea can be extended to 
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performance-related outcomes of any organizational forms, routines, and 
practices. That is, the more a form’s outcomes vary from the average 
outcome, the more risky and volatile an organizational form.
In general, the operational concept of risk requires ‘true’ and 
‘unchangeable or at least robust’ objective distribution, say, N(μ, σ2) where μ = 
E(X) and σ2 = Var(X)2. In other words, firms know the distribution that yields 
outcomes (Alvarez and Parker, 2009). Unlike risk, firms may be unable to 
assign probabilities under uncertainty and also be unable to assess the full 
range of possible outcomes. When a firm’s environment is uncertain, few 
decisions yield fully predictable outcome (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). In a 
statistical manner, firms are not certain about μ = E(X) and σ2 = Var(X), let 
alone its distribution function f. Even in case of a limited scope of 
uncertainty, as shown above, firms are often ignorant of possible future 
outcome (Shackle, 1972; 1979). Under this situation, firms will try to estimate 
the expected outcome μ with data x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) available to them. The 
best-known estimate of μ, for example, is X
—
 = Σni=1(xi/n), where the variance of 
the sample mean Var(X
—
) is given by σ2/n by the central limit theorem (CLT) 
(Casella and Berger, 2002: 236-238). The CLT, in crude terms, states that the 
sum of a large number of independent and identical random variables has 
normal distribution, whose mean has the decreasing variance as the sample 
size increases. This decreasing variance with a larger sample size implies 
decreasing uncertainty and more information. Generally denoting an 
estimate of μ by μ^, this example of X
—
 is when μ
^ = X
—
, and thus, Var(μ^) = Var(X
—
). 
The level of uncertainty can be generally formulated by Var(μ^).
In summary, when an outcome X of organizational behavior is a random 
variable with E(X) = μ, the risk of the behavior is Var(X) while its 
uncertainty is Var(μ^).
Suppose that this mathematical definition is applied to estimating the 
effect of having a research and development (R&D) department on a firm’s 
revenue. In this case, organizational behavior of interest is having a R&D 
department, and its outcome X is the firm’s revenue. Collecting revenue 
statistics x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) for firms with a R&D department and estimating 
its variance σ2 = Var(X) will yield the degree of risk involved in those firms 
having a R&D department. 
At the same time, calculating its mean X
—
 = Σni=1(xi/n) shows the average 
2 Normal distribution is assumed for the sake of expositional clarity.
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revenue of the surveyed firms with an R&D department. By comparing this 
mean to the mean revenue of comparable firms without an R&D department, 
an answer can be provided as to whether having an R&D department at a 
firm improves revenue or not. Suppose that there are other studies that could 
explain how an R&D department improves a firm’s revenue. If those studies, 
including this one, do not show agreement but yield contradictory findings, 
this implies a high variance in the estimated effect of R&D, or high value on 
Var(X
—
). This means high uncertainty involved in having an R&D department. 
Alternatively, suppose that senior managers in various firms are surveyed and 
asked if they think R&D improves a firm’s revenue. If their answers do not 
agree but reveal high variability, it can be inferred that an R&D department as 
an organizational form or practice entails high uncertainty.
For example, academic studies on total quality management (TQM) did 
not show consistent findings on performance (Powell, 1995). TQM advocates 
claim that TQM is widely acknowledged to be one of the most important 
organizational innovations in that it enhances the quality of products and 
services, reduces costs, and satisfies both customers and employees, leading 
to improved organizational effectiveness (Easton and Jarrell, 1998; Hackman 
and Wageman, 1995; Walton, 1986). On the contrary, its opponents suggest 
that a considerable number of firms tried to implement TQM, but actual 
performance increase did not materialize (Schaffer and Thompson, 1992). 
Inferring from divergent research results between these two lines of research, 
risk-uncertainty function for TQM adoption can be specified. For instance, 
the relationship between the decline in TQM’s popularity measured by the 
yearly counts of TQM articles and inconclusive evidence for its effectiveness 
can be interpreted in terms of high uncertainty involved in adopting TQM 
practices (Jung, 2008). On the other hand, risk mitigation of TQM practices 
for a given firm is undertaken by allowing trial-and-error for customizing 
quality practices to the unique problems and opportunities faced by that 
particular organization, which leads to lower levels of risk or, namely, smaller 
values for σ2 = Var(X) (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997).
Typology: Conservative, Innovative, Reformative, and 
Reactionary Behavior
Four modes of organizational behavior are proposed by overlapping two 
tabulations: inertia-conformity tabulation (i.e., Figure 1) and risk-uncertainty 
tabulation (Figure 2). This overlap is based on (1) match between normative 
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versus deviant behavior and low versus high uncertainty, and (2) match 
between inertia versus change and low versus high risk.
First, by definition, normative behavior implies statistically modal (i.e., 
frequent) behavior because norms are observed or followed by the majority 
of society. Therefore, the outcome distribution of a normative behavior is 
much better known than that of deviant behavior due to its larger number of 
observations, regardless of large or small variance in the distribution. By 
contrast, there are fewer cases of deviant behavior, with unknown possible 
outcomes or the likelihood of respective outcomes. Therefore, deviant 
behavior is characterized by uncertainty. It is, in other words, a matter 
concerning outcomes and their likelihoods of a specific behavior. There is 
high uncertainty in deviant behavior (i.e., lack of information on the 
behavior) while reduced levels of uncertainty is implied in normative 
behavior (i.e., more information on the outcome distributions).
Second, inertia vs. change corresponds to low vs. high risk. Doing what 
has been done repeatedly (inertia) increases “accountability” of processes and 
“reliability” of an outcome (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 72-73). Reliability 
means low variance by definition: inertia guarantees smaller variance in 
outcome or lower levels of risk than does change. In addition, accountability 
of inertia means that the decision-maker has a better sense of why a specific 
behavior results in a specific outcome in repeated trials.3 This accountability, 
in combination with reliability, requires that “organizational structures be 
highly reproducible” (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 75). Inertia fine-tunes 
organizational forms and routines through the cycle of variation-selection-
retention (Miner, 1994). In summary, inertia vs. change is a matter of 
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Figure 3. A Typology of Organizational Behavior.
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experience, whereas normative vs. deviant behavior is a matter of information. 
Becoming inert implies increased reliability and accountability, whereas 
becoming normative implies reduced uncertainty.
Informed by these matches between conformity and certainty and 
between inertia and low risk, we can name four forms of organizational 
behavior in the market. First, when an organization changes its behavior to 
follow others’ popular behavior, it cannot predict its own outcome if the 
organization has never experienced it before or it’s been too long since the 
event. This behavior represents normative change or “reformative” behavior 
in Figure 3. It is reformative because it tries something new but is not truly 
innovative because it follows known paths whose outcome is reasonably 
predictable with minor variances. Deviant change can be truly called 
“innovative” behavior whose outcome is, with few precedents, truly 
unknown. At the diagonal opposite to innovative behavior, normative inertia, 
or “conservative” behavior, represents constant agreement with the majority, 
whose outcome becomes most certain with least variability through repeated 
trials. Deviant inertia, or “reactionary” behavior, is positioned at diagonal 
opposite to reformative behavior.
In order to understand reactionary behavior better, imagine an example 
of market value of a product as an outcome of the product market. In 
addition, suppose that many producers are leaving the market because the 
market is no longer seen as lucrative. A producer sticking to its production is 
now uncertain of a new expected market value of his/her product due to 
increased environmental uncertainty (e.g., scarcer but less popular product 
now). Its realized market value, however, will be close to the new average 
value, whatever the average value is, because the firm has been routinely 
producing a reliable product with quality. In this sense, the producer is risk-
averse and involuntarily taking uncertain risks on a new expected market 
value for the product.
Deviant inertia is reactionary because behavior adheres to an ongoing 
trend or repeated pattern when most others choose to change. Inertia is no 
longer normative, but rather, change is a norm. Such a normative change is 
reformative in our typology. In sum, when one behavior is reactionary and 
de-institutionalized, it necessitates the emergence of another behavior as 
reformative and institutionalized. A once-dominant organizational form or 
strategy is replaced by another.
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The Dynamics of Organizational Forms and Institutions
In this paper, four modes of organizational behavior are proposed based 
on integrating organizational ecology and neoinstitutionalism. The major 
driving motivation of the typology is, as stated earlier in this paper, the 
guiding macro-level research on organizational dynamics based on 
integrating two leading sociological organization theories. In other words, 
typology is designed to apply to both the evolution of organizational forms, 
which has been the major theoretical topic without “successful” empirical 
results in organizational ecology, and the rise and fall of organizational 
practices and institutions resulting in the accumulation of diverse empirical 
case studies without testable hypotheses in neoinstitutionalism. Broadly 
speaking, the goal of this paper is to propose four dynamic stages of 
organizational behavior without regard to whether those behaviors are 
identified as organizational forms or institutionalized practices.
A form or practice starts as an innovative behavior. Once the innovative 
behavior is regarded as successful, its uncertainty is lowered, and the behavior 
is diffused to and implanted in other organizations. The behavior is now at its 
reformative stage. When the implantation is finely tuned and routinized by 
repeated trials to obtain a reliable outcome, the behavior is established as a 
conservative organizational form. If the form’s effectiveness declines due to 
increased environmental uncertainty, the form will remain or die as 
reactionary inertia. The birth of an organizational form as an innovative 
behavior, its growth to a reformative stage, mature peak at a conservative 
stage, and final decline to a reactionary status resembles a lifecycle of a 
biological individual. In Figure 3, the lifecycle starts at innovative, rotates 
counterclockwise to reformative and then to conservative, and finally ends at 
reactionary stage.
Various studies in organizational literature then can be classified 
according to typology, and holes can be found in the literature. For example, 
studies on founding and disbanding rates within a given population seem to 
be limited to the equilibrium or conservative stage of a population. Those 
studies examine the dynamics of individual organizations and not the 
dynamics of populations. This is contrary to Hannan and Freeman’s early 
ambition for population dynamics (see Hannan and Freeman, 1989: preface). 
The determinants of founding and disbanding rates at earlier or later stages 
may be worth examining. More importantly, more research should be 
conducted on transition from one stage to the next stage and evolution from 
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one form to another at the macro-level. Recent efforts to examine inter-form 
relationships are notable in this regard (Ingram and Simons, 2000; 
Schneiberg, 2007).
If research on organizational ecology tends to be concentrated on the 
conservative stage of an organizational form, then institutional studies on 
diffusion will most likely be limited to the reformative stage when legitimacy 
pressure is at its peak. It is important to know why some innovations fail 
while others settle as institutions (Abrahamson, 1991) and how institutions 
finally lose their legitimacy and fall into the reactionary stage (Davis, 
Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994). The next step is generating research 
propositions concerning those transition mechanisms from one mode of 
form or institution to the next mode in this typology.
Market Conditions and Transitions
What kinds of organizations drive transitions of organizational forms 
and practices can be inferred by reviewing various organizational theories. In 
Figure 3, transition from the innovative stage to the reformative stage is 
enabled by the reduction of uncertainty or gathering of information. Network 
scholars have shown that social relationships evolving from transactions play 
significant roles in reducing uncertainty in the pursuit of profits (Podolny, 
2001; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). At the same time, 
institutional economists observe that the most important function of 
institutions in a market system is reduction of uncertainty in the exchange 
(North, 1991a) or transaction cost (Williamson, 1981). Organizational 
scholars from neoinstitutionalism further argue that the process of being 
institutionalized is the process of gaining legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977), which is enabled by political efforts of institutional entrepreneurs 
(Haveman and Rao, 1997) and social activists’ efforts to build the social 
identity of an innovation (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Greve, Pozner, 
and Rao, 2006; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003). Generally speaking, 
reducing uncertainty and gaining legitimacy requires sociopolitical efforts by 
organizations with rich social capital that can assess the outcome of an 
innovation without much cost and by organizations with rich political capital 
that can influence others to adopt the same innovation and actively 
institutionalize the innovation as a legitimate practice.
If a transition to the reformative stage is mainly driven by sociopolitical 
efforts of institutionalization, the next transition to the conservative stage will 
be mainly driven by market competition. This is because reducing risks by 
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reliable and accountable production is achieved by a selection mechanism 
under competitive pressure (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). A form or practice 
will be fine-tuned through repeated cycles of variation-selection-retention in 
pursuit of optimal production (Miner, 1994) and may arrive at the fittest 
form during the conservative stage. In short, transition to the conservative 
stage is mainly driven by efficiency-driven organizations under high 
competitive pressure.
Transition to the reactionary stage, either by the demise of an 
organizational form or by deinstitutionalization, is studied less than other 
transitions. A few exceptional efforts (e.g., Ruef, 2004; Scott et al., 2000), 
however, suggest that both the external emergence of competing 
organizational forms and internal organizational decision-making affect the 
decline of organizational forms. Although more research and evidence need 
to be collected, it is roughly predicted that organizations with information 
disadvantage are less likely to detect increased environmental uncertainty, 
less likely to have resources for organizational changes, and eventually more 
likely to be inert while other organizations make reformative changes toward 
emerging, competitive strategies. Recalling social and political capitals as the 
source of information advantages, those reactionary organizations are likely 
lacking in political power and social networks necessary for information and 
influence due to information disadvantage. Summarizing sequential 
transitions from innovative to reformative, to conservative, and finally to 
reactionary stages, the first proposition is reached as follows.
Proposition 1: Transition to the reformative stage is mainly attributable to 
organizations with high political and social capitals which enable 
information advantages and legitimacy; transition to the conservative stage 
is attributable to organizations under high competitive pressure which 
accelerates selection processes; and finally, transition to the reactionary 
stage is attributable to organizations with low political and social capitals 
lacking information advantage and influence.
Larger Society and Transition
Due to the fact that the market is embedded in the larger society 
(Polanyi, 1944), societal factors that can affect the dynamics of organizational 
forms in the market must be taken into consideration, with particular focus 
on the state and the civil society that interact with the market. North (1981, 
1991b) points out that the state shapes the actors’ incentive structure in the 
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market by setting regulatory market institutions. This is one major way in 
which the state lowers market uncertainty. On the other hand, economic 
actors in the market pursue not only competitive advantages but also political 
rent as the source of economic revenue (Baumol, 1990). When the state 
establishes new rules of the game in the market and some innovative 
organizational forms actively respond to the new rules through political rent-
seeking, market uncertainty will be lowered in favor of those organizational 
forms (Fligstein, 1990, 2002). In short, strong market interventions by the 
state help some organizational forms develop to the reformative stage by 
political rent-seeking.
While a strong state may help reduce market uncertainty in ways that 
favor certain organizational forms to develop to the reformative stage, it is 
likely to hinder transition to the following stage. When an organizational 
form survives mainly through political advantages, not by competitive 
advantages, it is unlikely to develop into a fine-tuned form that produces 
highly reliable outcomes. The form will survive anyhow without optimal 
productions with politically supported by the state. The state may have 
incentives to favor one organizational form over another. In short, a strong 
state weakens the selection processes in the market and allows the survival of 
less reliable forms.
Through similar means, a strong state may hinder transition from the 
conservative to the reactionary stage. When a state has a strong interest in 
keeping dominant organizations at the conservative stage, it will protect them 
from environmental shocks and uncertainty while discouraging the 
emergence of alternative forms. Dominant organizations will lobby the state 
to modify legal institutions in order to shield their cores and routines from 
environmental changes. These mutual interactions will hinder the emergence 
of alternative forms and extend the conservative stage of dominant forms, 
even if the dominant forms are no longer effective in changing the 
environment. In sum, a strong state either helps or hinders transitions, 
depending on the stages.
Proposition 2. The stronger the state, the faster the transition to the 
reformative stage, but the slower the transition to the conservative and 
reactionary stages.
The role of civil society concerns information costs in the market. There 
have been numerous studies showing how civil society enhances information 
democracy and economic justice in the market (see Hague and Loader, 
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1999). Information democracy lowers information costs by making market 
information readily available to decision-makers. When decision-makers are 
producers, lowered information costs will enable them to collect information 
on success and failure of various strategies, adopt effective innovations, and 
throw away ineffective inertia (Scott and Davis, 2007: 293; Zuboff, 1988: 9). 
In short, the strong civil society helps transitions to the reformative, and later 
to the reactionary, stage. When decision-makers are consumers, the civil 
society provides consumers with better information on which producers are 
more reliable and dependable. Less reliable forms and practices will be 
consequently selected out of the market by consumers’ choices. In short, the 
strong civil society helps a transition to the conservative stage. Therefore, the 
strong civil society helps all the transitions and will eventually shorten the 
lifespan of an organizational form.
Proposition 3. The stronger the civil society, the stronger the information-
democracy and the shorter the lifecycle of organizational forms and 
practices.
Applications and Limitations
The typology discussed in this paper is not designed to describe perfect 
organizational forms. Rather, the typology mentioned is intended to play 
paradigmatic roles for identifying a gap in research and for pursuing studies 
on the evolutionary dynamics of organizational forms and institutions. The 
dynamism at the macro-level has been announced as top priority by 
organizational theories but rarely met the expectation both in organizational 
ecology and in neoinstitutionalism. To achieve this goal, four modes of 
organizational behavior are proposed here by crossing two behavioral 
dimensions adopted from organizational ecology (inertia vs. change) and 
neoinstitutionalism (normative vs. deviant) in the order of the lifecycle of an 
organizational form: innovative (deviant change), reformative (normative 
change), conservative (normative inertia), and reactionary (deviant inertia). 
In other words, the four modes do not imply four distinctive organizational 
behaviors, but rather, four dynamic stages of one behavior or form.
This paper also identified two distinctive characteristics of the outcome 
distributions underlying the two dimensions of behavior: low-risk vs. high-
risk underlying inertia vs. change, and low-uncertainty vs. high-uncertainty 
underlying normative vs. deviant. These distributional characteristics 
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clarified that transition from the innovative to the reformative stage is 
associated with decreasing uncertainty, transition to the conservative stage 
with decreasing risks, and transition to the reactionary stage with increased 
uncertainty.
It is important to note that increases and decreases in uncertainty and 
risk entailed in organizational forms are not simply a technical matter but 
determined considerably by sociopolitical factors, and the sociopolitical 
factors that can affect information costs and competitive pressure in the 
market have been explored and several propositions proposed on the 
transitional mechanisms from one mode to the next mode of organizational 
behavior. Specified in those propositions are how each transition can be 
either promoted or hindered by sociopolitical resources at the organizational 
level and by the state and the civil society at the societal level. Those 
propositions are neither exhaustive nor empirically true yet. Further 
theoretical explorations and empirical tests are required to clarify the 
evolutionary dynamics of organizational forms and institutions in the 
market.
Although the typology described in this paper does not aim to cover all 
possible modes of organizational behavior, one important missing mode 
could be ritual behavior. Merton (1957) identified ritualism as a major mode 
of adaptation in his typology of individual adaptation. As is presented in 
Figure 4, ritualistic behavior observes institutionalized procedures but the 
behavior does not necessarily have a goal. It was specified at the beginning of 
this paper that this paper is interested in goal-oriented organizational 
behaviors and, therefore, may not be bothered by ritualistic behaviors in 
Merton’s typology for human adaptation. Long ago, however, neoinstitu-
tionalism noticed the ritualistic characteristic of many organizational 
practices in an aimless pursuit of legitimacy (Meyer, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). This ritualism is often suggested as the cause of perpetuating an 
institution in spite of its questionable effectiveness. In sum, ritual organiza-







Figure 4. Merton’s Modes of Individual Adaptation.
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organizational form but is currently ignored in the above typology. A ritual 
stage might be positioned between the reformative and the conservative 
stages or between the conservative and the reactionary stages.
It should also be clarified that not all organizational forms pass the four 
stages in sequential order during their lifecycles. It is needless to say that most 
organizational experiments die at the innovative stage without progressing 
further. Some business fads and fashions (Strang and Macy, 2001) could skip 
the reformative stage, suddenly dominate a market at the conservative stage 
for a short period of time, and rapidly disappear without the reactionary 
period. These trajectories, marginalized in the typology here, might be better 
examined by other typologies (see Abrahamson 1991, for an example). It is 
also informative that the selective attention of decision-makers play an 
important role in diffusing not necessarily superior innovations (Denrell, 
2005; Denrell and Kovács, 2008; Denrell and March, 2001; Strang and Macy, 
2001). Roughly speaking, accelerating and skipping transitions between 
stages may be affected by how decision-makers correctly or erroneously 
estimate the risks and uncertainties entailed in strategic choices. Due to the 
fact that this paper provided a measurable formalization of risk and 
uncertainty, it could be a promising approach to examining implications 
between objective levels of risk and uncertainty and subjective estimations of 
them.
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